Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?: The 2006 Freshfields Lecture by Kaufmann-Kohler, Gabrielle
Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? 
The 2006 Freshfields Lecture 
by GABRIELLE K A U F M A N N - K O H L E R * 
A B S T R A C T 
This article has been adapted from the Freshfields lecture given on 14 November 
2006. 
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
ARBITRAL PRECEDENT: what a topic, given that it is common knowledge 
that international arbitration lacks a doctrine of precedent, at least as it is 
formulated in the common-law system.1 Regardless, arbitrators increasingly 
appear to refer to, discuss and rely on earlier cases.2 What motivates arbitrators to 
refer to earlier cases? Do they merely seek some guidance, an excuse or mask for 
the deficiencies in their own reasoning, an opportunity to contradict an esteemed 
colleague, or a chance to give lessons to the arbitration community? Alternatively, 
do they apply a de facto doctrine of precedent out of a sense of obligation? This 
lecture explores these questions. 
* Professor of Law, University of Geneva. The author thanks Aurelia Antonietti of Schellenberg Wittmer and 
the arbitration research team of Geneva University Law School, financed by the Swiss National Research 
Fund and comprised of Thomas Schultz, James Fry, Victor Bonnin, Caroline Kleiner and Mehmet Toral, 
for their assistance in researching the topic and finalising the footnotes. 
1
 See e.g. Catherine A. Rogers, 'Context and Institutional Structure in Attorney Regulation: Constructing an 
Enforcement Regime for International Arbitration' in (2003) 39 Stan. J Int'l L 1 at p. 37 n. 198; Andrea 
Kupfer Schneider, 'Getting Along: the Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in International Trade 
Organizations' in (1999) 20 Mich. J Int'l L 697 at p. 710 n. 41; Clyde C. Pearce and Jack Coe, Arbitration 
under NAFTA Chapter Eleven: Some Pragmatic Reflections upon the First Case Filed Against Mexico' in 
(2000) 23 Hastings Int'l and Comp. L Rev. 311 at p. 340 n. 99; Julia Ferguson, 'California's MTBE 
Contaminated Water: an Illustration of the Need for an Environmental Interpretive Note on Article 1110 of 
NAFTA' in (2000) 11 Colo. J Int'l Envt'l L and Pol'y 499 at p. 505. 
2
 The exponential growth of citations to other cases in investment awards since 2001 is well demonstrated in 
a study that appeared after the delivery of this lecture byjeffery P. Commission, 'Precedent in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: the Empirical Backing' in Transnational Dispute Management, 28 March 2007, at p. 6. 
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This lecture is divided into three main parts, in addition to this brief 
introduction and an equally brief conclusion. Following this introduction, Part II 
discusses some terminology and the role of precedent. Part III evaluates current 
practice in an effort to establish what arbitrators do. Part IV suggests reasons for 
why they do it. 
II. T E R M I N O L O G Y A N D T H E R O L E O F P R E C E D E N T IN 
D I F F E R E N T L E G A L S Y S T E M S 
Before discussing current practice, it may be useful to explain key terminology 
and the role of precedent in national and international legal systems. 
(a) Terminology 
The term 'precedent' is used in this lecture to refer to a binding precedent under 
the doctrine of stare decisis? which literally means 'to stand by what is decided'. 
It is also used to cover the notion of persuasive precedent,4 though some 
commentators consider this a contradiction in terms.5 Still, it is difficult to deny 
the possibility that stare decisis exists in a de jure (formal) form and also a de facto 
form.6 In the former, the court has a legal obligation to follow precedents, 
whereas in the latter, it follows precedent without legally being bound to do so.7 
Finally, 'precedent' often is used to refer to prior cases generally, without implying 
that these cases have any binding value.8 This lecture avoids this particular usage, 
instead preferring the simple phrase 'prior cases'. 
3
 See Black's Law Dictionary (7th edn, 1999), p. 1195, defining precedent as '[a] decided case that furnishes a 
basis for determining later cases involving similar facts or issues; [s]ec stare decisis'. See ibid. p. 1414, 
explaining that the doctrine of precedent requires 'a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same 
points arise again in litigation'. 
4
 Ibid. p. 1215. A persuasive precedent is a decision that is not binding but is entitled to respect and careful 
consideration. O n the consideration of reasoned arbitral awards as non-binding persuasive authority, see 
Thomas E. Carbonneau, 'Rendering Arbitral Awards with Reasons; the Elaboration of a Common Law of 
International Transactions' in (1984-85) 23 Cohan. J Transnafl L 579 at p. 581; Vicenzo Vigoriti, 'La 
decisione arbitrale come precedente' in (1996) 1 Riv. Dell'arb. 33 at p. 35; Jean Carbonnier, Droit civil: 
Introduction (1999), p. 276. The force and authority of precedent in civil law comes from the mission of the 
judge, who has the power to adapt and complete statutes when they are unclear or vague. See Yves Le Roy, 
Introduction generate au droit Suisse (2002), p. 164; Francois Terrc, Introduction generate au droit (1998), p. 248; 
Philippe Malinvaud, Introduction a I'etude du droit (2005), p. 146. 
5
 See Noah Rubins, 'In God We Trust, All Others Pay Cash: Security for Costs in International Commercial 
Arbitration' in (2000) 11 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 307 at p. 323; Rupert Cross andJ.W. Harris, Precedent in English 
Law (4th edn, 1991), p. 5. 
6
 See generally Raj Bhala, 'The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy)' 
in (1999) 14 Am. UInt'l L Rev. 845, at pp. 940 -942 . 
7
 See Bhala, supra n. 6 at pp. 940 -942 . See also Klaus Peter Berger, International Economic Arbitration (1993), p. 514; 
Heinrich Honscll, Nedim Peter Vogt and Thomas Geiser, ^ivilgesetzbuch, Basler Kommenlar (2002), Article 1, 
para. 39. 
8
 See e.g. Thomas W. Merrill, 'Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution' in (1997) 46 Duke I J 931 at p. 950, 
referring to the Lake Lanoux arbitration as a 'less clearly applicable precedent'. 
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(b) Precedent in National Legal Systems 
Within most national legal systems, courts follow earlier cases to some degree.9 
They may do so out of the intellectual comfort that comes from relying on tested 
solutions,10 out of a sense of obligation from the law or out of a fear of being 
reversed.11 At the same time, virtually all domestic courts alter their line of 
reasoning and disagree with earlier decisions over time.12 This should be seen as 
a positive characteristic of national legal systems, since, as the House of Lords 
declared in 1966 when it decided that it was no longer bound by its case 
decisions, 'too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular 
case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law'.13 As Lord 
Denning put it eloquently: 
[ I ] f we never d o a n y t h i n g wh ich has no t b e e n d o n e before , we shall never get a n y w h e r e . T h e 
law will s tand still whilst the rest of the wor ld goes on : a n d t h a t will b e b a d for b o t h . 1 4 
In sum, national courts follow earlier cases and may also depart from them. 
The degree of deference to earlier cases and the level of freedom to depart 
from prior rulings may vary from one jurisdiction to another, and even within one 
jurisdiction, depending on the court and the issue involved. In civil law countries, 
the precedential value of cases may be weaker than in common law countries, 
though it is nonetheless well established there. Indeed, civil law countries have 
9
 See e.g. James Dennis, 'Interpretation, and Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial 
Precedent' in (1994) 54 La. L Rev. 1 at p. 3, pointing out how precedent has a leading role in common law 
systems while it has a supporting role in civil law systems. Different from common law systems, it is necessary 
in civil law systems for the earlier decision to have a certain degree of rigour and prestige for the later courts 
to feel bound by it. In Switzerland, for example, the judges will consider the intensity with which the court 
has examined the case, whether the decision has been published, the expressions used, and the judicial body 
that has adopted the decision. See Peter Forstmoser, Einfuhrung in das Recht (2003), pp. 413-414 . 
10
 Malinvaud, supra n. 4 at p. 145. 
11
 In some civil law jurisdictions, there is a quasi-stare decisis effect. This is the case in Spain where the case law 
of the Tribunal Supremo is binding, provided that there are two prior decisions with the same line of 
reasoning. This case law is called doctrina legal. See STS 394/1990, 23 June 1990; STS 104/1992, 10 
February 1992; STS 622/1994, 25 June 1994; STS 1018/1994, 16 November 1994; STS 167/1997, 6 
March 1997; STS 564/2001, 8 June 2001; STS 1173/2006, 27 November 2006. Similarly, in Mexico, this 
effect has been implemented in article 192 et seq. of the Ley de Amparo, which requires five consecutive 
decisions that follow the same line of reasoning and that were approved by a minimum number of judges. In 
Germany, a rule affirmed repeatedly by the courts ('stdndige Rechtsprechungr) may become a customary rule and 
will be applied as such by the courts: Karl Larenz and Manfred Wolf, Allgemdner Teil des Burgerlichen Rechls 




 e.g. the French Cour de cassation is not legally bound by its prior cases, and it can reverse prior decisions. See 
Carbonnier, supra n. 4 at p. 276; Rene David, Les grands systemes de droit contemporains (2002), p. 108. See also 
Patrick Morvan, 'En droit, la jurisprudence est unc source de droit' in (2001) 87 Revue de la recherche juridique, 
droit prospectif 77 at p. 91; Jean-Francois Casile, 'Rctour sur les conditions d'existence du revirement de 
jurisprudence en droit prive' in (2004) 103 Revue de la recherche juridique, droit prospectif 639. In Switzerland, see 
infra n. 18. 
13
 Alfred T. Denning, The Discipline of Law (1979), p. 296. 
14
 Ibid. Introduction, quoting Denning LJ in Packer v. Packer [1954] P 15 at 22. 
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such notions as arret de principe15 and jurisprudence constante,16 which are similar to 
stare decisis except that they do not require adherence to a legal principle that has 
been applied only once before.17 For example, a departure from previous case law 
for the Swiss Supreme Court must be grounded in objective reasons such as a 
better understanding of the intent of the legislators, a change in circumstances, a 
change in legal conceptions or an evolution of societal mores.18 In case of doubt, 
the court tends to maintain the status quo even when a good reason for a change 
exists.19 
(c) Precedent in International Law 
What about precedents in international law? I refer here to the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, 
though my comments are valid for other international tribunals as well.20 
Article 59 of the ICJ Statute provides that '[tjhe decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case', 
15
 See Pierre Tercier and Christian Roten, La recherche et la redaction juridiques (2003), para. 1181, stating that, in 
Swiss law, arrets de principe provide a new perspective that is sufficiently well developed to constitute a guide in 
the future, which may be considered as precedent. See also Le Roy, supra n. 4 at p. 168. In France, with 
respect to the decisions of the Cour de cassation, see Terre, supra n. 4 at p. 241, Malinvaud, supra n. 4 at p. 
142 and Carbonnier, supra n. 4 at p. 276. 
16
 One speaks of jurisprudence constante where there is a series of cases that resolve a particular issue in a certain 
way, which then acts as a guide in the future in resolving that same issue. In Switzerland, the more constant 
and older the precedent is, the more reluctant the judge will be to reverse it. See ATF 122 I 57 at 59; ATF 
120 II 137 at 142; ATF 114 II 131 at 138. See Le Roy, supra n. 4 at p. 168. See also supra n. 6. For France, see 
Malinvaud, supra n. 4 at p. 142. In Germany, see supra n. 6. 
17
 In Switzerland, precedent may be fixed by a single decision where there is much uncertainty on a given 
issue. See Le Roy, supra n. 4 at p. 168; Forstmoser, supra n. 9 at p. 415. See also Ulrich Meyer-Cording, Die 
Rechtsnormen (1970), p. 69. Similarly, in France, a sole decision may constitute precedent under certain 
conditions and depending on the decision's quality, but this is not the general rule. See Carbonnier, supra n. 
4 at p. 271; Michel van de Kerchove, 'Jurisprudence et rationality juridique' in (1985) 30 Arch. phil. dr. 207 at 
p. 233; Malinvaud, supra n. 4 at pp. 142-143. 
18
 ATF 127 V 353 at 356; ATF 122 I 57 at 59; ATF 121 V 80 at 85-86; ATF 114 II 131 at 138; Honsell, Vogt 
and Geiser, supra n. 7, Article 1, para. 39; Forstmoser, supra n. 9 at p. 413. 
19
 ATF 126 I 81 at 93; Forstmoser, supra n. 9 at p. 412. 
20
 Another example is the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which has not 
expressly adopted the common law doctrine of precedent, though it has stated, when attempting to reconcile 
the different uses of precedent in the common law, civil law and public international law systems: 'It is 
necessary to stress that the normal rule is that previous decisions are to be followed, and departure from 
them is the exception; [t]he Appeals Chamber will only depart from a previous decision after the most 
careful consideration has been given to it, both as to the law, including the authorities cited, and the facts'. 
Prosecutor v. Alebovski, Decision on Appeal, IT-95-14/1-T, 24 March 2000, para. 109. However, the ICTR 
Appeals Chamber has gone a step further and acted as a common law court when it has relied on its prior 
cases or decisions of the trial courts it oversees, such as in Kambanda v. Prosecutor, where it used the standard 
for accepting a guilty plea that the ICTY Appeals Chamber had established or where it accepted another 
ICTY Appeals Chamber standard for determining when failure to present an issue during the trial 
constituted a waiver. See Kambanda v. Prosecutor, Decision on Appeal, ICTR 97-23-A, 19 October 2000, paras 
15-34, 49-95. See generally Mark A. Drumbl and Kenneth S. Gallant, 'Appeals in the Ad Hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals: Structure, Procedure, and Recent Cases' in (2001) 3 J App. Prac. and Process 589 at pp. 
632-633. 
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wording found also in the NAFTA.21 This language often is read as excluding a 
formal doctrine of precedent.22 Indeed, there is no de jure stare decisis in the ICJ. 
There is, however, a strong reliance on earlier judicial decisions, which are listed 
as 'subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law' in Article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute. Practice shows that past decisions are highly persuasive to the court.23 
The court itself explains its approach to prior cases in the following manner: 
[I]t is not a question of holding [the parties in the instant case] to decisions reached by the court 
in previous cases. The real question is whether in this case, there is cause not to follow the 
reasoning and conclusions of earlier cases.24 
The approach is similar to that of the W T O Appellate Body, which stated in the 
Shrimp Turtle II case: 
Adopted panel reports are an important part of the G A T T acquis ... They create legitimate 
expectations among W T O Members and, therefore, should be taken into account where they 
are relevant to any dispute.25 
Commentators forcefully assert that the W T O has no formal doctrine of 
precedent, though it would seem to have such a doctrine in practice.26 Thus, it 
would appear that at least two major international legal regimes adopt a type of 
de facto stare decisis doctrine. 
III. W H A T D O A R B I T R A T O R S D O ? 
Having discussed what precedent is generally, this part evaluates current practice 
in the field of international arbitration. The evaluation focuses on three different 
categories of dispute resolution: (1) international commercial arbitration; (2) 
sports arbitration; and (3) international investment arbitration. The reference to 
commercial arbitration in this lecture does not include the arbitrations conducted 
21
 Statute of the International Court of Justice (26 June 1945) 33 UNTS 993, art. 59; North America Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), art. 1136(1). 
22
 See e.g. Jose E. Alvarez, 'The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences' in (2003) 38 Tex. Int'lLJ 
405 at pp. 406-407; Royal C. Gardner, 'Taking the Principle of Just Compensation Abroad: Private 
Property Rights, National Sovereignty, and the Cost of Environmental Protection' in (1997) 65 U Cin. LRev. 
539 at p. 574 n. 180. 
23
 See e.g. Alain Pellet, 'Article 38' in A. Zimmermann et al. (eds), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A 
Commentary (2006), p. 784; Hugh Thirlway, 'The Sources of International Law' in M.D. Evans (ed.), 
International Law (2003), p. 133. 
24
 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Preliminary Objections Judgment) [1998] ICJ Rep. 
275, para. 28. 
25
 United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Appellate Body Report, 12 October 
1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 108. See also Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Appellate Body Report, 
4 October 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R, at 15. 
26
 See e.g. Bhala, supra n. 6 at pp. 941-942. 
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under commercial (in other words, non-ICSID) arbitration rules, which deal with 
investment disputes. 
(a) International Commercial Arbitration 
When issuing awards in international commercial arbitrations, do arbitrators rely 
on past awards? Moreover, do they create rules that have effects beyond the 
dispute submitted to them? I asked one of my research assistants to survey awards 
in order to answer these two questions. Several hundred awards later, he returned 
with a long, detailed memorandum that concluded that arbitrators do what they 
want with past cases and that there is no clear practice in this field. While one 
theoretically might be able to come up with some classification scheme, this 
assistant's response captures the basic impression that emerges from a survey of 
the cases in this field. 
Another survey reviewing awards applying the Vienna Sales Convention 
(CISG) gives the same impression. At first sight, one would expect the Sales 
Convention to be a field rich with arbitral precedents due to the fact that 
arbitrators are not limited to national law and that there are easily accessible 
databases of CISG cases. Surprisingly, a survey of those cases proved the contrary. 
Out of 500 cases, only about 100 were available in sufficient detail to make a 
finding possible,27 and out of these, only six referred to past awards.28 Scholarly 
writings appear to attract more attention from arbitral tribunals than past cases. 
Admittedly, this may give past cases some indirect influence, as scholars in the 
field of international sales rely on both court rulings and arbitral awards,29 
though one would have expected past cases to have had more of a direct 
influence. 
Still another survey, this time of International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
awards, yielded more nuanced results. Out of the 190 awards reviewed, about 15 
per cent cited other arbitral decisions. These citations were mostly made with 
regard to matters of jurisdiction and procedure, in connection for instance with 
the timeliness of an objection to jurisdiction,30 and the powers of the tribunal to 
order provisional measures.31 Reference to earlier cases was also made in 
connection with the determination of the law governing the merits, for instance 
27
 Research carried out on Pace School of Law's online database of CISG cases: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu. 
28
 e.g ICC 7754 (1995), referring inter alia to ICC 5428 (1988) and ICC 5540 (1991) as support for the finding 
that 'the function of damages is to substitute an equivalent to the obligation which was created ...', a view 
given further comfort through references to scholarly writings and French court rulings; see also ICC 7331 
(1994), referring to ICC 3267 (1979) and ICC 3131 (1979) to establish the tribunal's authority to ground its 
decision on its understanding of the agreement and on general principles of law such as good faith. 
29
 See e.g. F. Ferrari, H. Flechtner and R.A. Brand (eds), The Draft UNCITRAL Digest and Beyond: Cases, Analysis 
and Unresolved Issues in the UN. Sales Convention (2004); also P. Schlechtriem and I. Schwenzer (eds), Commentary 
on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (2005). 
30
 ICC Award 8420 (1996) in (2000) XXV YB Comm. Arb. 328. 
31
 ICC Award 10973 (2001) in (2005) XXX YB Comm. Arb. 77, referring inter alia to ICC Award 4126 (1984), 
ICC Award 7489 (1992) and ICC Award 3540 (1980). 
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on party autonomy32 or the methods available to arbitrators to determine the 
governing law when the parties have made no choice.33 
By contrast, substantive issues rarely prompt reference to arbitral awards. If 
they do, then it is in conjunction with scholarly writings and court decisions. 
Whether on substantive or procedural matters, reference to prior cases generally 
is made out of an abundance of caution.34 The rule relied upon most often arises, 
in any event, out of the applicable national arbitration law or the relevant 
institutional rules. Aside from procedural issues, perhaps, one can see no 
precedential value or self-standing rule creation in commercial arbitration 
awards. 
This conclusion does not ignore the theory of the lex mercatoria, the existing 
studies on 'arbitral jurisprudence',35 or the famous Dow Chemical award.36 These 
may well constitute the 'dream' component referred to in the title of this lecture.37 
Indeed, the rules embodied in commercial arbitral 'jurisprudence' or those said 
:
« ICC Award 6379 (1990) in (1992) XVII TB Comm. Art. 212, referring at p. 214 to ICC Award 1512, though 
seemingly out of an abundance of caution; see also ICC Award 7047 (1994) in (1996) XXI TB Comm. Ark 79, 
referring at p. 83 to the ^ Carte Blanche arbitration' (unpublished ICC Award of 25 January 1988) and its 
subsequent confirmation in Carte Blanche (Singapore) Pte Ltd v. Carte Blanche International Ltd, 888 F.2d 260 (2d 
Cir. 1989). 
33
 ICC Award 9302 (1998) in (2003) XXVIII TB Comm. Arb. 54 referring at p. 59 to the Dow Chemical Award, 
ICC Award 4131. Other instances of reference to past awards in procedural matters include the following: 
on the timing of objections to jurisdiction: ICC Award 8420 (1996), in (2000) X X V IB Comm. Arb. 11; on the 
scope of the terms of reference with regard to new claims: ICC Award 6197 (1995) in (1998) XXIII TB 
Comm. Arb. 13; on the arbitrability of disputes: ICC Award 8423 (1994) in (2001) XXVI TB Comm. Arb. 153; 
on the binding power of arbitration clauses over groups of companies: ICC Award 4131 (1982) in (1984) IX 
TB Comm. Arb. 131; on sovereign immunity: ICC Award 3493 (1983) in (1984) IX TB Comm. Arb. 111; on the 
interpretation of pathological'clauses: ICC Award 5294 (1988) in (1989) XIV TB Comm. Arb. 137, and ICC 
Award 7920 (1993) in (1998) XXIII TB Comm. Arb. 80. In this regard, Jan Paulsson noted that the largest 
domain where awards were cited by arbitrators concerns the choice of law rule. See 'La Lex Mercatoria dans 
l'arbitrage CCI ' in (1990) Rev. Arb. 55 at p. 80. 
34
 See e.g. ICC Award 9163 (2001) in (2003) 1 Rev. Arb. 227, citing several ICC awards that have followed a 
principle already well established through extensive references to French jurisprudence. Also, references to 
past cases for such matters as the tribunal's competence to rule on its own jurisdiction (ICC Award 5485 
(1987) in (1989) XIV TB Comm. Arb. 156), or the parties' capacity to choose the law governing the contract 
(ICC Award 6379 (1990) in (1992) XIV TB Comm. Arb. 212) seem to be used more as illustrations than as 
sources of law as these rules apply in any event by operation of the law or rules governing the arbitration. 
35
 See e.g. L'apport de la jurisprudence arbitrate (Dossiers de l'lnstitut du droit et des pratiques des affaires 
internationalcs, ICC Publication 4 4 0 / 1 , 1986); Christian Larroumet, Apropos de la jurisprudence arbitrale' 
in (2006) 348 Gazette du Palais 5; Andrea Pinna, 'La specificite de la jurisprudence arbitrale' in Jusletter, 16 
October 2006. 
36
 ICC Partial Award 4131, 23 September 1982, in S. Jarvin and Y. Derains (eds), Collection ICC Arbitral Awards 
(1990), p. 151: 'The decisions of these tribunals [ICC arbitral tribunals] progressively create caselaw which 
should be taken into account, because it draws conclusions from economic reality and conforms to the needs 
of international commerce, to which rules specific to international arbitration, themselves successively 
elaborated, should respond'. 
37
 Depending on the level of legal recognition granted to the lex mercatoria, that is to be considered as a legal 
order on its own, as a sufficient set of rules or as the reflection of usages or general principles of international 
business law, the concept, in the first sense, or even in the second, can indeed be seen as a dream or as a 
myth. See Guillaume R. Delaume, 'Comparative Analysis as a Basis of Law in State Contracts: the Myth of 
the Lex Mercatoria' in (1989) 63 Tul. L Rev. 575; see also Vanessa L.D. Wilkinson, 'The New Lex Mercatoria: 
Reality or Academic Fantasy?'in (1995) UJInt'lArb. 103. 
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to be part of lex mercatoria are not creations of arbitral case law per se.38 
Arbitrators simply apply principles that prevail in national laws and international 
treaties or general principles of law. A few examples taken from a list drawn up 
some years ago by Jan Paulsson,39 which Klaus Peter Berger since has expanded,40 
demonstrate this well: pacta sunt servanda, good faith, force majeure, respect for 
international public policy, venire contra factum proprium and mitigation of damages. 
Much more than such principles, what is truly striking in international 
commercial arbitration is not the hypothetical rule creation by arbitral 
precedents, but arbitrators' broad discretion in determining and applying the law 
that governs the merits of any particular case. Indeed, arbitrators have an 
inclination to 'transnationalise' the rules they apply, either because they are 
subject to no meaningful controls when it comes to the merits, they act in a 
transnational environment, or they are themselves very often from different 
legal cultures. I have discussed the various methods of transnationalisation 
already in a separate publication.41 Regardless of the method, the purpose of 
transnationalisation is to remove the dispute from the ambit of a possibly 
inadequate national law. 
This inclination towards transnationalisation is in line with the newer version 
of the lex mercatoria, which Emmanuel Gaillard in particular has described not as a 
legal system, but as a method^2 a way to avoid application of rules that are 
inconsistent with the needs of international commerce.43 Similarly, one also could 
38
 Contrary to the first conception of the lex mercatoria, seen as a specific legal order, as the demonstration of 
such specific legal order was based on the existence of transnational law-makers, and among them the 
international arbitrators. This was the conception defended in 1964 by Berthold Goldman, 'Frontieres du 
droit et Lex Mercatoria' in (1964) 9 Arch. phil. dr. 177; and later 'La Lex Mercatoria dans les contrats et 
l'arbitrage internationaux: realite et perspectives' in (1979) \06 J Droit Int'l 475; 'Lex Mercatoria' in (1983) 
3 Forum Internationale 3; 'Nouvelles reflexions sur la Lex Mercatoria' in C. Dominice, R. Patry and C. 
Reymond (eds), Etudes de droit international en I'honneur de Pierre Lalive (1993), p. 241; and Clive M. Schmitthoff, 
'The Law of International Trade, its Growth, Formulation and Operation' in C M . Schmitthoff (ed.), The 
Sources of the Law of International Trade with Special Reference to East-West Trade (1964), p. 3. 
39
 Paulsson, supra n. 33. 
40
 Klaus Peter Berger, The Creeping Codification of the Lex Mercatoria (1999). 
41
 See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 'Le contrat et son droit devant l'arbitre international' in F. Bellanger et al. 
(eds), Le contrat dans tons ses etats (2004), p. 361. 
42
 See Emmanuel Gaillard, 'Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria: Towards the Selective Application of Transnational 
Rules' in (1995) 10 ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal 208, and, for the French version: 'Trente ans 
de Lex Mercatoria. Pour une application selective de la methode des principes generaux du droit' in (1995) 
122 J Droit Int'l 5 at p. 21. A similar view is adopted by Andreas F. Lowenfeld in 'Lex Mercatoria: an 
Arbitrator's View' in (1990) 6 Arb. Int'l 133 at p. 143. See also Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman who insist on the 
meaning of this new approach of lex mercatoria: 'it cannot be too strongly emphasized that applying 
transnational rules involves understanding and implementing a method, rather than drawing up a list of the 
general principles of international commercial law'. Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman, On International Commercial 
Arbitration (E. Gaillard and J. Savage (eds), 1999), p. 813. 
43
 Gaillard, 'Thirty Years of Lex Mercatoria', supra n. 42 at p . 229: 'The whole aim of transnational rules is not 
to diminish the role of national laws, but rather to avoid having solutions that have not received sufficient 
support in comparative law prevail over solutions more generally accepted in the international community'. 
See also Paulsson, supra n. 33 at p. 70; Ole Lando, 'The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial 
Arbitration' in (1985) 34 ICLQJ47; and Lowenfeld, supra n. 42 at p. 148, who asserts that the lex mercatoria, 
if properly used, is supposed 'to clarify, to fill gaps, and to reduce the impact of peculiarities of individual 
country's laws, often not designed for international transactions at all'. 
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refer to what Michael Mustill, in his famous article for Lord Wilberforce, called 
'the micro lex mercatorid: 'a law is newly minted by the arbitrator on each 
occasion, with every contract the subject of its own individual proper law'.44 
In short, the arbitrator's sweeping freedom to apply the law that allows him or 
her to 'mint' the rules to take account of the specificities of each case — or the 
case-driven propensity to transnationalise the applicable law — are in direct 
contradiction with the very idea of precedent. 
(b) Sports and Domain Name Arbitration 
The role of precedent is entirely different in sports arbitration. This lecture looks 
at this both from a quantitative and from a qualitative perspective. 
From the quantitative perspective, statistics and history show a strong evolution 
towards reliance on other sports law cases. A survey of all the cases published by 
the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS) from the first CAS case in 1986 to 2003 
shows that only one award in six cited prior cases.45 A review of the cases since 
2003 shows a drastic change: nearly every award contains one or more references 
to earlier CAS awards. 
The conclusion of this quantitative approach to sports arbitration is further 
strengthened by the qualitative approach. For example, a 2004 award reads as 
follows: 
In CAS jurisprudence there is no principle of binding precedent, or stare decisis. However, a CAS 
Panel will obviously try, if the evidence permits, to come to the same conclusion on matters of 
law as a previous CAS Panel. Whether that is considered a matter of comity, or an attempt to 
build a coherent corpus of law, matters not.46 
For purposes of this lecture, it does matter. The fact is that a coherent corpus of 
law, some call it lex sportiva, is being built.47 Two examples support that 
observation. 
The first example is strict liability for doping offences, which involves the 
principle that a doping offence occurs whenever a prohibited substance is found 
in an athlete's body, irrespective of the athlete's intention or negligence in 
ingesting the banned substance. A series of CAS awards consistently has upheld 
44
 Michael J. Mustill, 'The New Lex Mercatoria: the First Twenty-Five Years' in M. Bos and I. Brownlie (eds), 
Liber Amicorum for the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce (1987), p. 157. 
45
 Research carried out on the basis of M. Reeb (ed.), Digest of CAS Awards 1986-1998 (2001) and M. Reeb 
(ed.), Digest of CAS Awards II1998-2000 (2002). 
46
 IAAFv. USA Track & Field and Jerome Young, CAS 2004/A/628, 28 June 2004, unreported, at para. 73. 
47
 See Eric Loquin, 'L'utilisation par les arbitres du TAS des principes generaux du droit et le developpement 
d'une lex sportiva' in A. Rigozzi and M. Bernasconi (eds), The Proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(2007), p. 99; see also Ken Foster, 'Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: the Court of Arbitration for Sport's 
Jurisprudence' in I. Blackshaw et al. (eds), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984-2004 (2006), p. 420; James 
A.R. Nafziger, 'Lex Sportiva' in (2004) 1-2 International Sports Law Journal 3; Jens Adolphsen, 'Eine lex 
sportiva fur den internationalen Sport?' in Die Privatisierung des Privatrechts — rechtliche Gestaltung ohne staatlichen 
Zwang {2002), p. 281. 
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this principle.48 The World Anti-Doping Code codified this arbitral practice. The 
official comments to the Code even specifically state that '[t]he rationale for the 
strict liability rule was well stated by the Court of Arbitration for Sport in the case 
of Quigley',49 and then go on to quote a long passage of that award. The main 
reason for applying strict liability is fairness to the community of competitors, or 
in the terms of the award: 
It is true that a strict liability test is likely in some sense to be unfair in an individual case ... 
where the athlete may have taken medication as the result of mislabelling or faulty advice for 
which he or she is not responsible ... [I]t is a laudable policy objective not to repair an 
accidental unfairness to an individual by creating an intentional unfairness to the whole body of 
other competitors. This is what would happen if banned performance-enhancing substances 
were tolerated when absorbed inadvertently.50 
As a second illustration of arbitral rule creation in sports, there is the concept of 
non-significant fault or negligence. According to the Anti-Doping Code, an 
athlete who tests positive for a prohibited substance will be suspended for two 
years. This sanction can be reduced if 'he/she bears no Significant Fault nor 
Negligence'.51 The drafters of the Code did not define these terms, leaving this 
task to the arbitrators. Since the adoption of the Code, CAS panels ruling on 
non-significant fault have systematically considered other awards. Characteristically, 
the second award rendered under the Code referred to the first one, distinguished 
it, and concluded that 
in the absence any pertinent precedent, the Panel is of the opinion that the application of 'No 
Significant Fault or Negligence' is to be assessed on the basis of the particularities of the 
individual case at hand.52 
Ever since, CAS panels consistently have adopted the same reasoning. Inevitably, 
the analysis of the growing number of precedents has become more elaborate. In 
one of the latest awards, the panel referred to no less than 11 previous precedents 
before reaching its conclusion.53 In sum, I submit that these cases demonstrate 
the existence of a true stare decisis doctrine within the field of sports arbitration.54 
48
 See e.g. Djamel Bourns v. Federation Internationale dejudo (FT}), CAS 98/214, 17 March 1999, CAS Digest II 291, 
at para. 16, which contains a series of awards in support of this principle, i.e. CAS 96/156, 10 October 1997; 
CAS 95/141, 22 April 1996; and CAS 92/63, 10 September 1992. 
49
 Comment Art. 2.1.1 WADC. 
50
 USA Shooting & Quigley v. International Shooting Union (UIT), CAS 94/129, 23 May 1995, CAS Digest I 187, 
paras 14 and 15. 
51
 Art. 10.5.2 WADC. 
52
 Diego Hipperdinger v. ATP Jour Inc., CAS 2004/A/690, 24 March 2005, available at www.atptennis.com, at 
para. 75 (emphasis added). 
53
 Mariano Puerta v. International Tennis Federation (ITF), CAS 2006/A/1025, 12 July 2006, available at 
www.itftennis.com, at para. 11.2 et seq. 
54
 See also Dominique Hascher's observations on Pamesa Valencia v. Euroleague Basketball, CAS 2004/A/605 in 
(2007) 134 JDroitlnt'l 253. 
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The phenomenon of rule creation through arbitral awards is even more 
striking in another type of dispute resolution mentioned here in passing, which is 
domain name 'arbitration' under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy (UDRP).55 Although not arbitration per se, it is comparable for present 
purposes. The rules applied in domain name dispute resolution are uniform rules 
of universal reach issued by a private body, namely, the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). 
The statistics here are compelling. Out of 110 awards issued in the fall of 2006, 
540 citations to prior domain name decisions were made in 85 cases. The 
decision-makers systematically cite prior cases to support their decisions and to 
provide pertinent examples from earlier decisions.56 This generalised practice is 
not surprising if one takes into account the limited number and recurrent nature 
of the issues before domain name panels,57 which involve questions such as 
whether a domain name is confusingly similar to another one,58 whether the 
complainant has a legitimate interest in the domain name,59 and whether the 
infringements were made in bad faith.60 In resolving these issues, panels 
sometimes distinguish the instant case from other cases.61 On some occasions, 
they even adopt a solution contrary to their own opinion for the sake of 
consistency: 
In making its finding, the Panel wishes to clarify that its decision ... is based on the need for 
consistency and comity in domain name disputes 'jurisprudence'. Were it not for the persuasive 
force of the cited decisions, this Panel would have expressed [a different] view ... Absent the 
consistency of approach which has found favour with numerous earlier panels, this Panel would 
have seen no good reason for [the solution it now adopts] .,)2 
Another case focuses on the parties' expectations to justify consistency in the 
following terms: 
•'•' On the UDRP process, see e.g. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Thomas Schultz, Online Dispute Resolution: 
Challenges for Contemporary Justice (2004), p. 36 el seq. 
'•<• See e.g. WIPO Case D2006-0523; WIPO Case D2006-0625; WIPO Case D2006-0699; WIPO Case D2006-
0802; WIPO Case D2006-0831; WIPO Case D2006-0837; WIPO Case D2006-0924; WIPO Case D2006-
1602. 
j7
 A summary of the most recurrent issues has been created by the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center 
to promote consistency and predictability in the dispute resolution system, even if the overview is not binding 
on the panelists and is said not to be precedential in nature. See WIPO Case D2005-0061 at n. 3. The 
Overview can be found at www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/overview/index.html. 
58
 WIPO Case D2006-0696; WIPO Case D2006-0731; WIPO Case D2006-0779; WIPO Case D2006-0846; 
see WIPO Case D2006-0873; WIPO Case D2006-1602. 
59
 WIPO Case D2006-0670; WIPO Case D2006-0731; WIPO Case D2006-0744; WIPO Case D2006-0823; 
WIPO Case D2006-0855; WIPO Case D2006-0873; WIPO Case D2006-0874; WIPO Case D2006-0879; 
WIPO Case D2006-0924; WIPO Case D2006-0926; WIPO Case D2006-0964; WIPO Case D2006-1064; 
WIPO Case D2007-0002. 
60
 See e.g. cases on typo-squatting, WIPO Case D2006-0536; WIPO Case D2O06-0779; WIPO Case D2006-
0845; WIPO Case D2006-0887. See also cases on cyber-squatting, WIPO Case D2006-0765; WIPO Case 
D2006-0825. 
61
 WIPO Case D2006-0926: 'The WIPO UDRP panel decisions cited by the Complainant are not directly 
relevant and applicable to the present case for different reasons'. 
« WIPO Case D2004-0338. See also WIPO Case D2006-0157. 
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Part ies in U D R P p roceed ings a re ent i t led to k n o w tha t , w h e r e the facts of two cases are 
mater ia l ly indis t inguishable , the compla in t s a n d responses will be eva lua ted in a consistent 
m a n n e r regardless of the ident i ty of the panellists; . . . w h e n policy d i sagreements d o arise, 
panellists shou ld p a u s e a n d cons ider w h e t h e r a consensus has e m e r g e d tha t m i g h t inform wh ich 
w a y they shou ld rule o n these types of issues. If such a consensus has e m e r g e d , panellists should 
e n d e a v o r to follow tha t consensus a n d thus p r o m o t e consis tent appl ica t ion of the U D R P . 6 3 
In conclusion, UDRP decision-makers follow earlier cases as binding precedent 
largely out of the desire to create consistent rules. 
(c) Investment Arbitration 
Is investment arbitration closer to commercial arbitration or to sports and 
domain name arbitration? A review of the practice shows that it is evolving 
towards a position in between these two extremes.64 
While tribunals seem to agree that there is no doctrine of precedent per se, 
they also concur on the need to take earlier cases into account. Some link the 
absence of a doctrine of precedent to Article 53 of the ICSID Convention, 
according to which 'the award shall be binding on the parties'.®' This does not 
appear to be an extremely convincing basis to deny the existence of any form of 
precedent in this field. Granted, nothing in the Convention's travaux preparatoires 
suggests that the doctrine of stare decisis should be applied, though nothing in the 
travaux preparatoires suggests that it should not be applied.66 In lieu of many others, 
a quotation from the recent award in El Paso v. Argentina (which is reiterated in Pan 
American v. Argentina and BP v. Argentina^1) will suffice to illustrate the general 
consensus: 
63
 W I P O Case D2004-0014 and W I P O Case D2005-0061 at n. 3. See also W I P O Case D2000-1774 at n. 3 and 
W I P O Case DWS2002-0001, stating: 'Although Panels are not bound to follow the decisions of prior Panels, 
it nevertheless is appropriate to determine whether a majority view has developed among other Panels that 
have considered the same issue. Not only do such decisions frequently have persuasive weight and authority, 
but also, they reflect a consensus that is worthy of some deference. Divining and following such a consensus 
helps to ensure consistency among U D R P decisions, a critical component of any system of justice. 
Otherwise, and given the lack of an appellate remedy, the expected result in any given case would be 
random based on the identify [sic] of the Panelists, which would undermine the credibility of the entire 
U D R P process'. 
64
 After the delivery of the Freshfields lecture, the following studies became known or were published on 
precedent in investment arbitration: Christoph Schreuer and Matthew Weiniger, 'Conversation Across 
Cases: Is there a Doctrine of Precedent in Investment Arbitration?' in C. MacLachlan, L. Shore, M. 
Weiniger and L. Mistelis (eds), International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles Investment Treaty Law 
(forthcoming 2007); Jeffery P Commission, 'Precedents in Investment Treaty Arbitration: a Citation Analysis 
of a Developing Jurisprudence' in (2007) 24 J Arb. Int'l 129 and Commission, supra n. 2. 
65
 Emphasis added. See e.g. Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: a Commentary (2001), p. 1082. 
66
 See Christoph Schreuer, 'Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration' in 
(2006) 3—2 Transnational Dispute Management 11. Pierre Duprey, 'Do Arbitral Awards Constitute Precedents? 
Should Commercial Arbitration be Distinguished in this regard from Arbitration Based on Investment 
Treaties?' in E. Gaillard (ed.), Towards a Uniform International Arbitration Law? (2005), p. 267. 
67
 BP America Production Co. and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case A R B / 0 4 / 8 , Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 
July 2006; Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case A R B / 0 3 / 
13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 July 2006. 
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ICSID arbitral tribunals are established ad hoc, .. . and the present Tribunal knows of no 
provision, ... establishing an obligation of stare decisis. It is nonetheless a reasonable assumption 
that international arbitral tribunals, notably those established within the ICSID system, will 
generally take account of the precedents established by other arbitration organs, especially those 
set by other international tribunals.68 
To what practical result does this approach lead? Because space is limited, this 
lecture illustrates the result with three issues: (1) the umbrella clause; (2) the most 
favoured nation clause; and (3) the notion of fair and equitable treatment. Each 
issue is discussed below. 
(i) Umbrella clause 
A review of the relevant decisions raises three considerations. First, there would 
seem to be a significant inconsistency between the two SGS awards. Secondly, 
there are a number of decisions that adopt a restrictive approach towards 
umbrella clauses, such as Salini v. Jordan^Joy Mining v. Egypt,10 and more recently 
the El Paso v. Argentina and Pan American v. Argentina decisions, which stated that: 
an umbrella clause cannot transform any contract claim into a treaty claim, as this would 
necessarily imply that any commitments of the State in respect to investments, even the most 
minor ones, would be transformed into treaty claims.71 
Thirdly, the analysis reveals that other tribunals, such as the ones in Eureko v. 
Poland,72 Noble Venture v. Romania1^ and Siemens v. Argentina1^ have adopted the 
opposite view and have accepted that the concept of an umbrella clause 'is 
usually seen as transforming municipal law obligations into obligations directly 
recognizable in international law'.75 In sum, the tribunals are divided when it 
comes to the umbrella clause, and no clear rule has emerged. Some tribunals 
have noted that their decisions were dependent on the terms of the bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT) involved. However, this explanation does not provide a 
satisfactory justification for all of the discrepancies.76 
Might the explanation for these discrepancies concern the dividing line 
between commercial and public international law arbitrators, or, if you prefer, 
68
 El Paso Energy International Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 
April 2006, para. 39. 
69
 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.pA. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case ARB/02/13, Award, 31 
January 2006. 
70
 Joy Mining Machinery Ltd v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 August 
2004. 
71
 El Paso Energy v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra n. 68 at para. 82. 
72
 Eureko B. V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award, 19 August 2005. 
73
 Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case ARB/01/11, Award, 12 October 2005. 
74
 Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/02/08, Award, 6 February 2007. 
75
 Noble Ventures v. Romania, supra n. 73 at para. 53. 
76
 It is true, though, that there is no inconsistency in the interpretation of the same treaty provisions so far. 
Overall, the umbrella clause contained in the United States-Argentina BIT, for instance, which has been put 
to the test on a number of occasions, has been subject to a quite consistent restrictive interpretation. 
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'publicists' and 'privatistes'? The question implies that the privatistes may be more 
lenient and flexible than the publicistes when it comes to treaty interpretation 
because they import contract interpretation standards. This possible explanation 
seems to miss the mark; an analysis of the composition of the different tribunals 
does not lead to any conclusive results. Therefore, there must be another 
explanation for the inconsistency. 
Underlying this matter is, of course, the debate of the overall object and 
purpose of BITs. Should interpretative doubts be resolved in favour of the 
investor? The SGS v. Philippines tribunal,77 for instance, answered in the 
affirmative, while the El Paso arbitrators favoured a balanced interpretation.78 
Implied in the purpose of the BIT lies the more general political or philosophical-
ethical question of the balance of global economy, of which foreign direct 
investment is an important part. Is there presently an imbalance between the 
protection of property or investment and the protection of other public goods? 
This is a vast issue that this lecture does not attempt to address. It is an issue that 
may well contribute to shaping investment law in coming years. 
(it) Most favoured nation clause 
Turning to the most favoured nation (MFN) clause and its application to dispute 
resolution, one can distinguish between two schools, the Mqffezini and the Plama 
schools. At first sight, they seem to conflict, Mqffezini being for the application of 
the MFN clause to dispute resolution rights and Plama against it. Upon a closer 
look, however, they appear to supplement rather than contradict each other. 
Indeed, Mqffezini1^ concerned MFN clauses in the presence of an ICSID 
dispute resolution provision and sought to avoid a waiting period or similar 
requirement. The Mqffezini tribunal expressly limited the potential impact of the 
MFN clause in the following terms: 
[If the Treaty] provides for a particular arbitration forum, such as ICSID, for example, this 
option cannot be changed by invoking the clause, in order to refer the dispute to a different 
system of arbitration. Finally, if the parties have agreed to a highly institutionalized system of 
arbitration that incorporates precise rules of procedure, which is the case, for example, with 
regard to the North America Free Trade Agreement and similar arrangements, it is clear that 
neither of these mechanisms could be altered by the operation of the clause because these very 
specific provisions reflect the precise will of the contracting parties.80 
SGS Societe Generate de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case ARB/02/6, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, at para. 116. 
El Paso Energy v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, supra n. 68, at para. 70. 
Emilio Agustin Mqffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 January 
2000; Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004; 
Camuzzi Int'l SA. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/03/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 10 June 2005; Gas 
.Natural SDG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/03/10, Award, 17 June 2005; National Grid v. Argentine 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction, 20 June 2006; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA. 
and Vivendi Universal SA. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/03/19, and AWG Group Ltd v. Argentine 
Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2006. 
Emilio Agustin Mqffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, supra n. 79, at para. 63. 
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By contrast, Plama dealt with attempts to import, in whole or in part, the 
ICSID dispute settlement mechanism into a treaty that either provided for 
another dispute settlement method or limited the scope of the ICSID arbitration 
clause.81 According to the Plama tribunal, there is a presumption that an MFN 
clause does not extend to dispute resolution matters, except when the contracting 
parties have expressed a contrary interest. 
Hence, in theory there appears to be a clear distinction between the two 
schools. In practice, however, I would submit that they can easily be reconciled. 
Indeed, in actual application, they can be combined without conflicting. The rule 
that appears to emerge from this combination is the following: MFN clauses can 
be used to overcome waiting periods and similar admissibility requirements, but 
not to replace, in whole or in part, the dispute resolution mechanism provided in 
the treaty upon which jurisdiction is based. In sum, unlike with umbrella clauses, 
arbitral practice appears to be evolving towards a consistent rule. 
(Hi) Fair and equitable treatment 
As a third and last illustration of the emergence of rules in ICSID arbitration, this 
part focuses on the principle of fair and equitable treatment. Before doing so, 
however, it should be mentioned that a review of the decisions regarding 
expropriation also shows that consistent case law is being developed in that area 
and that tribunals tend to follow in the footsteps of their predecessors. This is 
obvious as far as regulatory expropriation is concerned, where the approach is to 
assess the legitimacy of the aim of the measure, the degree of impact upon the 
investor, and proportionality.82 In particular, one clearly sees the influence of 
previous case law in this context, especially the influence of Teemed and Waste 
Management.^ However, it is too early to assess whether this influence is 
comparable in its effects to the doctrine of precedent or if it simply denotes a 
trend that still needs confirmation. 
In an article published in 2005,84 Christoph Schreuer reviewed the evolution 
of the fair and equitable treatment standards from their inception with the Neer 
81
 Plama Consortium Ltd v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case A R B / 0 3 / 2 4 , Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 
2005; Salmi SpA and Italstrade SpA v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case A R B / 0 2 / 1 3 , Award, 31 January 
2006; Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case A R B / 0 4 / 1 5 , Award, 13 September 
2006. 
82
 See e.g. Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 
May 2003; Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case ARB(AF)/00/3, Award, 30 April 
2004; International Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, Award, 26 January 2006; 
Methanex v. United States, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005; EnCana Corp. v. Republic of 
Ecuador, LCIA Case UN3481, UNCITRAL, Award, 3 February 2006; Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) 
v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006; Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case A R B / 0 1 / 1 2 , 
Award, 14 July 2006; LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case A R B / 0 2 / 1 , Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006; Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Republic of 
Hungary, supra n. 81. 
83
 See supra n. 82. 
84
 See Christoph Schreuer, 'Fair and Equitable Treatment' in (2005) 6 J World Investment and Trade 3. 
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case in 192685 to the Garni case in 2004.86 Schreuer shows in this study a clear 
progression over time towards more exacting requirements imposed on the host 
state. Supplementing the analysis with awards rendered in the last two years, such 
as Thunderbird v. Mexico,61 Saluka v. Czech Republic,6® LG&E v. Argentina,6^ PSEG v. 
Turkey®0 and Siemens v. Argentina,^ yields the following results: 
• Tribunals, in this area as in all others, pay great attention to the wording 
and the purpose of the treaty concerned, as well as to the facts. 
• However, beyond these case specifics, one can see some standards 
emerging. The need for stability of the legal and business framework in the 
host state has been affirmed repeatedly92 and, in the words of the LG&E 
tribunal, is 'an emerging standard of fair and equitable treatment in 
international law'.93 For example, the PSEG tribunal recently confirmed 
that the fair and equitable treatment obligation was seriously breached by 
what has been described as the 'roller-coaster' effect of the continuing 
legislative changes found in that case.94 
• The same applies to the fact that tribunals have consistently abandoned the 
requirement of bad faith on the part of the host state. As underlined by 
the Azurix tribunal in 2006, 'Except for Genin, there is a common thread in 
the recent awards under NAFTA and Teemed which does not require bad 
faith or malicious intention of the recipient State as a necessary element 
in the failure to treat investment fairly and equitably'.95 This statement 
recently has been repeated in the Siemens award in virtually the same 
words.96 
• Similarly, the legitimate expectations of the foreign investor are now a key 
element against which the behaviour of the host state is assessed.97 The 
tribunal in PSEG underlined the significance of the investor's legitimate 
85
 Neer Case (United States v. Mexico), 4 RIAA 60 (Gen. CI. Comm'n 1926). 
86
 Garni Investments, Inc. v. United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, 15 November 2004. 
87
 Thunderbird v. United Mexican States, supra n. 82. 
88
 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, supra n. 82. 
89
 LG&E v. Argentine Republic, supra n. 82. 
90
 PSEG Global v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case ARB/02/5, Award, 19 January 2007. 
91
 Siemens v. Argentine Republic, supra n. 74. 
92
 See e.g. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000; Mqffezini v. Kingdom of 
Spain, supra n. 79; MTD Equity Sdn BhdandMTD Chile SA. v. Chile, ICSID Case ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 
2004; CME Czech Republic B.Vv. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 14 March 2003; Teemed v. United 
Mexican States, supra n. 82; Azurix v. Argentine Republic, supra n. 82. 
93
 LG&E v. Argentine Republic, supra n. 82 at para. 125. 
94
 PSEG v. Republic of Turkey, supra n. 90 at paras 250 and 255. 
95
 Azurix v. Argentine Republic, supra n. 82 at para. 372. 
96
 'It emerges from this review [of the cases invoked by the parties] that, except for Genin, none of the recent 
awards under NAFTA and Teemed require bad faith or malicious intention of the recipient State as a 
necessary element in the failure to treat investment fairly and equitably, and that, to the extent that it has 
been an issue, the tribunals concur in that customary international law has evolved'. Siemens v. Argentine 
Republic, supra n. 74 at para. 299. 
97
 See Stephen Fietta, 'Expropriation and the Fair and Equitable Standard: the Developing Role of Investors' 
Expectations' in (2006) 23-25 J Int'l Arb. 375. 
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expectations, which, 'as the Tribunal in Teemed concluded, requires a 
treatment that does not "detract from the basic expectations on the basis of 
which the foreign investor decided to make the investment" \ 9 8 
These standards seem sufficiently established to influence future tribunals. At the 
same time, it is true that they are rather broad and imprecise, which will leave 
enough room for future tribunals to use their own discretion in applying these 
standards. Broad standards are malleable and leave room for interpretation. By 
comparison, established jurisprudence on umbrella clauses — where the choice is 
between yes or no - would be much more constraining. This may be one of the 
reasons why it may take longer to achieve. 
(d) Summing Up Current Practice: Significant Variations 
To sum up this section on current practice, there are significant variations 
between the different categories of disputes: 
• there is no meaningful precedential value of awards in commercial 
arbitration; 
• there is strong reliance on precedents in sports arbitration, which comes 
close to a true stare decisis doctrine; and 
• in investment arbitration, there is a progressive emergence of rules through 
lines of consistent cases on certain issues, though there are still 
contradictory outcomes on others. 
IV W H Y A R B I T R A T O R S D O W H A T T H E Y D O 
Why are there such differences in the degree to which arbitrators rely on prior 
cases? This question is the focus of this part of the lecture. To this question, there 
are two types of answers: a general one and answers specific to each field. 
(a) A General Explanation Linked to the State of Development of the Law 
For the general answer, it may be helpful to seek some guidance from legal 
philosophers about the relationship between law and the practice of following 
precedents. Lon Fuller, one of the most influential American legal philosophers, 
wrote a famous essay in which he sets out how one may fail to make law." In this 
essay, a well-meaning king tries to respond to the need for proper regulation 
expressed by his subjects, and he tries to make law. However, he fails in this 
endeavour because he either decides cases on a completely ad hoc basis and thus 
PSEG v. Republic of Turkey, supra n. 90 at para. 240, quoting para. 154 of Teemed v. United Mexican States, supra 
n. 82. 
This essay is included in Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. edn, 1969), pp. 33-41, as the first main 
section of ch. II. 
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in a wholly unpredictable manner or, when he means to create rules, he applies 
them in an entirely inconsistent fashion. Fuller explains that, in both cases, the 
king fails to make law because predictability and consistency are indispensable 
elements of law.100 A rule of law is only a rule of law if it is consistently applied so 
as to be predictable. As Matthew Kramer, who teaches legal philosophy in 
Cambridge, would say, 'a higgledy-piggledy arrangement would be antithetical to 
the rule of law'.101 
The creation of rules that are consistent and predictable is part of what Fuller 
calls the 'inner (or internal) morality of law'.102 When making law, decision-
makers have a moral obligation to strive for consistency and predictability, and 
thus to follow precedents.103 It may be debatable whether arbitrators have a legal 
obligation to follow precedents — probably not - but it seems well settled that 
they have a moral obligation to follow precedents so as to foster a normative 
environment that is predictable. 
This moral obligation is not the same under all circumstances or in all fields. 
Its scope depends, among other factors, on how well developed the applicable 
body of rules is. Norberto Bobbio, one of Italy's most revered twentieth century 
scholars, has shown that the development from a nascent body of rules to a full-
blown legal system follows several stages.104 In the earlier stage, one witnesses the 
emergence of a dispute resolution body. In the later stage, a central law-creating 
institution takes shape, in addition to the adjudicative body.103 The modern state 
Ibid. pp. 38-39: 'Rex's bungling career as legislator and judge illustrates that the attempt to create and 
maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry in at least eight ways ... The first and most obvious lies in a 
failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoe basis. The other routes are 
... the enactment of contradictory rules ... [It] docs not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in 
something that is not properly called a legal system at all'. For further developments on and a clarification of 
Fuller's principles of legality, see Matthew H. Kramer, Objectivity and the Rule of IMW (forthcoming 2007), ch. 2, 
referring to 'regularity and uniform applicability' as forming part of 'the set of conditions that obtain 
whenever any legal system exists and operates'. 
Kramer, supra n. 100. See further Matthew H. Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivism (1999), p. 142 146, referring 
to a 'bewilderingly higgledy-piggledy array of contrary signals and interventions' incompatible with the 
concept of law, and Michel van de Kerchove and Francois Ost, Legal System Between Order and Disorder (1994), 
p. 135, elaborating on the 'principle of unity binding different elements together so as to make them into a 
system', which is defeated by an inconsistent application of rules. 
Fuller refers to the avoidance of the eight ways to fail to make law as the 'the eight demands of the law's 
inner morality', in his ch. II, entitled 'The Morality that Makes Law Possible'. See Fuller, supra n. 99, at p. 46. 
Ibid. p. 42: 'The inner morality of law ... embraces a morality of duty and a morality of aspiration. It ... 
confront[s] us with the problem of knowing where to draw the boundary below which men will be 
condemned for failure, but can expect no praise for success, and above which they will be admired for 
success and at worst pitied for the lack of it'. Fuller further speaks, at p. 43, of a 'moral duty to try to be 
clear' and a 'moral duty with respect to publication'; the same moral duties apply to the other requirements 
of the internal morality of law. As Kramer, supra n. 100, concludes, 'Fuller contended that his eight principles 
constitute the "inner morality of law" and that they therefore establish an integral connection between the 
legal domain and the moral domain'. 
Norberto Bobbio, 'Ancora sulle norme primarie e norme secondarie' in (1968) 59 Rivista di Filosofta 35 
(translated into French as 'Nouvelles reflexions sur les normes primaires et secondaires' in Ch. Perelman 
(ed.), La regie de droit (1971), p. 104. 
Ibid. p. 51 (original Italian version): 'Ebbene: il passaggio da un sistema sociale primitivo all'ordinamento 
giuridico e awenuto in un primo tempo con l'istituzione del giudice e solo in un secondo tempo del 
legislatore'. 
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is the epitome of a system having reached the later stage.106 International law is 
considered to be just beyond the first stage and moving towards the second one.107 
In essence, the less developed the body of rules is, the more important the role of 
the dispute resolver will be with respect to the creation of rules.108 To put it simply, 
rule creation through dispute settlement depends on the need for predictability.109 
When arbitrators apply a national law in commercial arbitration, that law is 
sufficiently developed to be predictable, and the arbitrators' role does not involve 
developing rules belonging to this national law. This is the role of the national 
legislators. When arbitrators apply a body of rules that is less developed and is still 
in the process of being formed, their role with respect to the establishment of 
predictable rules is much more important. This is so today in sports law and 
investment law. 
This is the general answer to the question of why arbitrators do or do not refer 
to precedents. Before moving on to the specific answers, the question arises 
whether this general explanation is equally applicable to all three categories of 
disputes reviewed here: commercial, sports and investment disputes. Is the 
situation changed by the fact that investment treaty tribunals are treaty-based 
international or at least hybrid tribunals that are part of the international legal 
system, as opposed to private arbitral tribunals governed by national law in 
commercial and sports arbitration? The answer seems to be in the negative. 
While it may reinforce the need for internationally consistent solutions, the 
international nature of the dispute resolution mechanism does not fundamentally 
alter things. What really matters are the stage of development of the law and the 
need for overall consistency and predictability. 
(b) Some Field-Specific Explanations 
The role of arbitrators also depends on other factors, which are specific to the 
field in which they act. In commercial arbitration, there is no need for developing 
See e.g. Joseph Raz, 'The Institutional Nature of Law' in (1975) 38 Modern Law Review 491: 'Many, if not all, 
legal philosophers have ... agreed that one of the denning features of law is that it is an institutionalized legal 
system [with] norm-applying institutions such as courts ... and norm-creating institutions such as 
constitutional assemblies, parliaments, etc ... [T]he existence of norm-creating institutions [is] characteristic of 
modern legal systems' (emphasis added). 
Bobbio, supra n. 104 at p. 51. 
Ibid. pp. 51-52: 'II giudice, une volta istituito, assume di solito anche la funzione della produzione normativa 
ad integrazione o addirittura in concorrenza col diritto consuetudinario proprio di un sistema promitivo. In 
tal modo riunisce in se entrambe le funzioni della conservazione e della trasformazione del sistema. Solo 
quando, attraverso un processo ulteriore di divisione del lavoro, si formano in societa piii evolute organi cui 
viene attribuita la competenza specifica della produzione normativa, il giudice diventa l'organo specifico 
della conservazione del sistema.' 
O n the need for predictability in the international arena, see e.g. Gunther Teubner, 'Un droit spontane dans 
la societe mondiale' in Ch.-A. Morand (ed.), Le droit saisi par la mondialisation (2001), p. 199 ('Les exigences 
sociales pesant sur ce droit auto-cree par la societe mondiale ne sont plus essentiellement celles de la 
regulation politique des processus sociaux, mais proviennent des besoins juridiques originels de securite et de 
reglement des conflits'). See also Pierre Lalive, 'Tendances et methodes en droit international prive' in (1977) 
155 Hague Academy of International Law, Collected Courses 69. 
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consistent rules through arbitral awards because the disputes are most often fact-
and contract-driven. The outcome revolves around a unique set of facts and upon 
the interpretation of a unique contract that was negotiated between private actors 
to fit their specific needs. Unsurprisingly, awards are published only sporadically 
in this context, unlike sports and investment arbitration, where publication has 
become the rule. 
By contrast to the situation in commercial arbitration, in sports arbitration 
the development of consistent rules through arbitral awards is greatly needed. 
The rules applied in international sports arbitration mostly are those of sports 
governing bodies, such as international federations. They emanate from entities 
with a monopolistic position. Although these federations are private entities, their 
rules resemble administrative and sometimes criminal rules, and deal with the 
same recurrent issues. 
As a result, there is a strong requirement of a level playing field and fairness to 
athletes, or in legal terms, equal treatment. In pragmatic terms, this requirement 
becomes strikingly obvious if one bears in mind that the athlete's performance on 
the playing field is measured by universal sports standards. The stopwatch is the 
same wherever and whenever a race takes place. The equality in front of the 
stopwatch must be replicated when it comes to the application of legal rules.'10 
With regard to investment law, there would appear to be a strong need for 
consistent rule creation. There are numerous similarities between investment and 
sports arbitration. For instance, both involve review of the decisions or actions of 
a governing body, be it a government or a sports federation. Yet the need for 
consistency is not as strong in investment disputes as in sports disputes. Indeed, 
there is not the overall expectation of equal treatment or consistency among 
investors as there is for athletes. It is true that investors come from one country 
and invest in another under one treaty. In addition, it is true that there are many 
countries and that there are many treaties that are not all the same. Nevertheless, 
there are recurring issues in investment arbitration as well, which must be 
resolved by the application of one and the same rule of law. For the predictability 
of investments and the credibility of the dispute resolution system, that rule 
cannot change from one proceeding to another. 
Hence, more consistency must be the goal. As was shown above, rules 
gradually have emerged on certain issues. Others could have been added, for example, 
the admission in principle of a distinction between treaty and contract claims111 
One notes, not surprisingly, that the same concern for equality before the law is very much present in the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Companid de Aguas delAconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case ARB/97/3, Decision 
on Annulment, 3 July 2002; Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case ARB/00/06, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 16 July 2001; Salini Construtorri S.p.A. and Italstrade S.pA. v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case ARB/ 
00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001; Impregilo S.pA. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case ARB/ 
03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005. More recently acknowledged by the tribunal in BP America v. 
Argentine Republic, supra n. 67, at para. 97 and Pan American Energy v. Argentine Republic, supra n. 67. See also 
Siemens v. Argentine Republic, supra n. 74. 
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or certain aspects of expropriation.112 Other questions still are unsettled.113 Will 
those also reach consistent solutions over time? Optimists will answer in the 
affirmative, arguing that rule creation cannot be linear and that the road is 
necessarily bumpy, with dead-ends and u-turns. Pessimists will respond in the 
negative, pointing to more fundamental disagreements. Pragmatists will look for 
ways to foster consistency. What ways are there? 
Can the ICSID annulment mechanism be of assistance in bringing about 
consistency? This would appear to be the case with respect to jurisdictional issues. 
However, because of the relatively narrow scope of the annulment grounds, it is 
unlikely to produce consistent outcomes on the merits. The recent decision in 
Patrick Mitchell v. Congo114 has even shown that the annulment mechanism can 
sometimes introduce more confusion than consistency.115 Even if this is a one-
time mishap, it demonstrates the difficulties in seeking to achieve consistency 
through an annulment body that is not permanent. Another possibility that could 
bring consistency is the idea of an appeals facility in ICSID arbitration.116 
However, this idea appears to have been abandoned, which is a positive 
development since its drawbacks clearly outweighed its advantages. 
Another approach to foster consistency may be for arbitral tribunals 
systemically to rely on the rules applied in a consistent line of cases and to depart 
from them only for very compelling reasons. This would actually be a stare decisis 
doctrine applied not to a single decision, but to a line of cases, or a jurisprudence 
constante. With time, this practice could even develop into customary international 
law.117 It would imply not only a well established practice but also an opinio juris, 
namely, the belief among states, investors and arbitrators that, in the absence of 
compelling reasons to do otherwise, a tribunal must follow the solution arising 
from a consistent line of earlier cases. 
Reasonable minds may differ on whether such a stare decisis practice is workable 
in a decentralised mode of regulation, with ad hoc tribunals only and no central, 
supervising institution binding them together. Indeed, in national legal systems, 
the doctrines of stare decisis and jurisprudence constante generally are deemed to imply 
112
 See Azurix v. Argentine Republic, supra n. 82; Telenor v. Republic of Hungary, supra n. 81; LG&Ev. Argentine Republic, 
supra n. 82; Siemens v. Argentine Republic, supra n. 74. 
113
 As discussed supra for the umbrella clause and the MFN clause, see supra nn. 69 to 81 and accompanying 
text. 
114
 Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for the 
Annulment of the Award, 1 November 2006. 
115
 Emmanuel Gaillard, A Black Year for ICSID' in New York Law Journal, 1 March 2007, reprinted in (2007) 
134 J Droit Int'l 359. 
116
 See transcript of the second conference of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law's 
Investment Treaty Forum on Appeals and Challenges to Investment Treaty Awards: 'Is it Time for an 
International Appellate System?', 7 May 2004, published in (2005) 2 Transnational Dispute Management. 
1>7 Thunderbird v. United Mexican States, Separate Opinion (Dissent in Part) of Thomas Walde, 26 January 2006, 
at para. 16. 
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a hierarchy among courts.118 If one has doubts, still another possibility to consider 
would be to introduce a system of preliminary rulings like the one practised 
before the European Court of Justice pursuant to Article 234 of the EC Treaty. 
This system works well in harmonising European law; it also may work well in 
providing consistency with investment law.119 
V C O N C L U S I O N 
In conclusion, I emphasise three main points: 
First, as arbitration expands in numerous areas and as economic activities 
become more diverse and complex, we must increasingly differentiate between 
types of disputes and users. 
Secondly, whether the development of binding rules through arbitral decisions 
is desirable or not depends on necessity, namely, the need for certainty and 
predictability, as well as the need for consistency or equal treatment. Such needs 
clearly exist in areas where the law is not yet well developed. 
Thirdly, we are at a time when we probably have reached or perhaps passed 
the peak of globalisation and trade liberalisation, with the breakdown of the 
Doha Rounds, increasingly protectionist regulators, and the accession of trade 
sceptics to the US Congress. We are at a time of painful transition from a bipolar 
world to a multipolar regime. This is a time when, because of the changing 
environment, the predictability and consistency of the rule of law are more 
important than ever. 
Finally, it is important to remember that the credibility of the entire dispute 
resolution system depends on consistency, because a dispute settlement process 
that produces unpredictable results will lose the confidence of the users in the 
long term and defeat its own purpose. 
These final points lead to the overall conclusion that 'arbitral precedent' is a 
necessity for certain types of disputes, if not only for the sake of the rule of law. 
8
 In addition to a proper reporting system. So e.g. John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (3rd cdn, 
1990), for whom '[t]he duty of repeating errors is a modern [i.e. nineteenth century] innovation', which may 
have resulted from the improved quality of law reports, but was more likely a result of the hierarchical system 
of appellate courts established in the nineteenth century. For civil law references, see Terrc, supra n. 4 at p. 
237. Boris Starck, Henri Roland and Laurent Boyer, Introduction au droit (2000), pp. 331-332; Marianne 
Saluden, 'La jurisprudence, phenomene sociologique' in (1985) 30 Arch. phil. dr. 191 at p. 195; van de 
Kerchove, supra n. 17 at p. 233; Carbonnier, supra n. 4 at p. 271; Le Roy, supra n. 4 at p. 168. In principle, 
lower courts are deemed to follow the decisions of a higher court. However, in some countries, lower courts 
are allowed to disagree with higher courts, though only when strict conditions are met. See e.g. Geneva Court 
of Justice, SJ 1987 232 at 235-236 , where the court stated that it would not follow the precedent of the Swiss 
Supreme Court if there were serious and objective reasons that suggested that the previous reasoning was 
wrong. 
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 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Annulment of ICSID Awards in Contract and Treaty Arbitrations: Are there 
Differences?' in E. Gaillard and Y. Banifatemi (eds), Annulment of ICSID Awards (2004), p. 221. See Schreuer 
and Weiniger, supra n. 64; Schreuer, supra n. 66. 
